Land & Water Law Review
Volume 4

Issue 2

Article 4

1969

Section 3 Rights under the Taylor Grazing Act
Calvin E. Ragsdale

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Ragsdale, Calvin E. (1969) "Section 3 Rights under the Taylor Grazing Act," Land & Water Law Review: Vol.
4 : Iss. 2 , pp. 399 - 430.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Ragsdale: Section 3 Rights under the Taylor Grazing Act
University of Wyoming
College of Law

LAND AND WATE:R
LAW REVIEW
1969

VOLUME IV

NUMBER 2

Congress enacted the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934. In the following
article the author describes the basic mechanics and qualifications
necessary for obtaining the use of public lands under Section 3 of
the Act. Mr. Ragsdale also considers whether one gets a legally protected right after having obtained a Section 3 permit, and if so, the
nature and extent of the protection which the courts will give such
right.

SECTION 3 RIGHTS UNDER THE
TAYLOR GRAZING ACTt
Calvin E. Ragsdale*
I.

A

INTRODUCTION

the Taylor Grazing Act1 is a major piece of
land use and conservation legislation, it has not been
explored very extensively by legal scholars.' Most authors
who have considered the Act analyze it in terms of political,
as opposed to legal, considerations. One author has put it
LTHOUGII

thus:
The practice of hiring an attorney by both individual ranchers and by livestock groups to represent
them in discussions and actions with the BLM is an
intriguing aspect of the BLM-rancher relationships.
The contravening power of the ranchers versus the
BLM is political power, not legal. Do the ranchers
not know this; or do they just feel more comfortable
t This study was financed by a grant to the Land and Water Law Center
from the United States Steel Foundation.
* Associate, Corthell & King, Laramie, Wyoming; B.A. 1965, Southern
Illinois University; J.D. 1968, University of Wyoming.
1. 48 Stat. 1269 (1934), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315g, 3151-315m, 315n315p (1964).
2. Only one law review article appears to be exclusively devoted to the Act:
Kingery, The Public Grazing Land&, 43 DENvER L. J. 329 (1966). The Act
has received a great deal of non-legal analysis. See, e.g., Calef, Private
Grazing and Public Lands (1960); Clawson & Held, The Federal Lands:
Their Use and Management (1957); Foss, Politics and Grass (1960); The
Public Lands (Carstensen, ed. 1968) for treatments of the Taylor Act, as
well as treatment generally of land law history in the United States.
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after retaining an attorney ? Perhaps the attorney
is retained simply as a spokesman for the ranchers.'
The implication seems to be that the grazing permits held
by livestock owners do not represent cognizable legal rights,
but merely represent a beginning point for a political power
struggle between livestock owners and the Bureau of Land
Management. The authors who have treated the Taylor Act
seem to have virtually ignored any analysis of "rights" Which
the holders of permits issued under the Act might expect to
be protected. This article will examine two questions: 1)
Does the permit which a livestock owner obtains represent
a cognizable legal right; and 2) if it does represent such a
right, what is the extent of the right?
Notwithstanding the lack of treatment of the legal effects of the Act, much has been written with regard to the
pre-Taylor Act history of the public domain, the passage of
the Taylor Act, and its early administration.' The historical
aspects of the Act and its early administration will not be
reviewed here. Although attitudes at the time of the passage
of the Act (principally those of conservationists) have probably influenced the nature and extent of the Taylor right,
the extent of such influence is not within the scope of this
paper. To consider the above questions, it is necessary to
examine the Act generally.

II.

THE ACT GENERALLY

It has been said of the Taylor Act that "It was intended
to reverse policy completely with respect to the unreserved
public domain from free, unregulated, common use to leased,
regulated, exclusive use." ' The purposes of the Act as stated
by Congress are set forth in two places in the Act: the Preamble and Section 2.7 The preamble of the Act states that
3. Calef, Private Grazing and Public Lands 138, n.8 (1960) (hereinafter cited
as Calef).
4. The Bureau of Land Management is a division within the Department of
Interior. It was created by combining the Land Office and Grazing Service
and is charged with administering most, but not all, federal lands. The
Bureau of Land Management will be also referred to in this article as
Bureau or BLM.
5. See generally the texts cited supra note 2. For a good short history, see
Kingery, The Public Grazing Lands, 43 DENVER L. J. 329, 329-33 (1966).
6. Calef 57. See also Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir.
1938).
7. 48 Stat. 1269-70 (1934).
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it is an Act "(t)o stop injury to the public grazing lands
by preventing over-grazing and soil deterioration, to provide
for their orderly use, improvement, and development, to
stabilize the livestock industry dependent upon the public
range, and for other purposes."8 Section 2 of the Act sets
forth these purposes in slightly different language, by giving
the Secretary of the Interior a broad grant of power "to
accomplish the purposes of this Act and to insure the objects
of such grazing districts, namely, to regulate their occupancy
and use, to preserve the land and its resources from destruction or unnecessary injury, to provide for the orderly use,
improvement and development of the range.... '9
To implement these purposes, the Taylor Act provides
for the creation of grazing districts made up "of vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved lands from any part of the
public domain of the United States (exclusive of Alaska),
which are not in national forests, national parks and monuments, Indian reservations, revested Oregon and California
Railroad grant lands, or revested Coos Bay Wagon Road
grant lands, and which in his [i.e. the Secretary of Interior]
opinion are chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage
crops.... " A limitation was originally placed on the number of acres of land which could be placed in such districts,"
but a subsequent amendment eliminated this limitation."
Those lands within grazing districts are commonly referred
to as "Section 3 lands."
The Act provides that Section 3 lands are to be administered by the Secretary of the Interior through a system of
preference permits, under such rules and regulations as are
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act.'" Section 3
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits for
the grazing districts "to such bona fide settlers, residents, and
other stock owners as under his rules and regulations are
entitled to participate in the use of the range, upon the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

48 Stat. 1269 (1934).
48 Stat. 1270 (1934).
48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (bracketed material added).
48 Stat. 1269 (1934).
43 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
§ 2, 48 Stat. 1270 (1934).
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payment annually of reasonable fees in each case to be fixed
or determined from time to time ... .
In granting such permits, however, the Secretary is
limited by the proviso of Section 3. Permits can only be
issued to citizens of the United States, to those who have
filed the necessary declarations of intention to become citizens, or to groups, associations, or corporations authorized
to do business in the State in which the district is located.
Further, preference is to be given "to those within or near
a district who are landowners engaged in the livestock business, bona fide occupants or settlers, or owners of water or
water rights, as may be necessary to permit the proper use
of lands, water or water rights, owned, occupied, or leased
by them. . .. "" Further, the Section provides that "no permittee complying with the rules and regulations laid down by
the Secretary... shall be denied the renewal of such permit,
if such denial will impair the value of the grazing unit of
the permittee, when such unit is pledged as security for any
bona fide loan."'
14. § 3, 48 Stat. 1270 (1934).
15. § 3, 48 Stat. 1270 (1934). This particular provision would seem to go a
long ways toward the elimination of the hated transient ("tramp") sheepman by cutting off his access to the public domain through the requirement
of ownership of land and water. It was rare that the transient sheepman
owned any land or water rights. Instead, he depended on the public lands
for his entire operation. It should be noted that shortly after the passage
of the Act and its implementation by administration through the Grazing
Service, the "tramp" sheepman ceased to exist in the Western states. See
Calef 52, 61, 68.
16. § 3, 48 Stat. 1271 (1934). This provision immediately suggests to the
literal reader an excellent way to protect this permit. In fact, Calef has
suggested:
One provision of the act made it virtually impossible to revoke a
permit if the permittee did not violate the rules established in the
act and in the Federal Range Code . . . Since cancellation of a
permit would inevitably impair the value of a grazing unit, any
rancher who was granted an original one-year permit could make
himself invulnerable to cancellation by merely pledging the unit
as security for a small loan. Calef 70.
Calef is inaccurate on at least two points. In referring to one-year
permits, he seems to be referring to the license which is granted in lieu
of the long-term permit until such time as an adjudication of the range
can be had. The Interior Department determined early that the provision
of Section 3 of the Taylor Act did not apply to temporary licenses, but only
to permits, which are by definition the result of adjudication. Alford Roos,
Grazing Decisions (hereinafter cited as G. D.) 38, 40 (1958) 57 I. D. 8
(1938) (dictum, but later applied in Charles H. McChesney, G. D. 693
(1958), 65 I. D. 231 (1958)).
Further, in the case of LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d 428 (D. C. Cir. 1963),
the Court dealt a blow to this portion of the Act. In LaRue, the federal
lands on which appellant had grazing permits were exchanged for lands
owned by North American Aviation in a different grazing district. This
was done under § 8 of the Taylor Act and effectively eliminated the
'appellants' use of the land or of any other federal lands. The appellants
urged that "if the Secretary may not refuse to renew a permit when the
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Section 3 also provides that the permit shall be of a
duration not to exceed ten years. This is "subject to the
preference right of the permittees to renewal in the discretion
of the Secretary . . ., who shall specify from time to time
numbers of stock and seasons of use. '"'7 The Secretary is
authorized, under certain circumstances (severe drought,
other actual causes, general epidemic and disease) during
the life of the permit to reduce, remit, refund or authorize
postponement of payment of grazing fees. Finally, the
section provides: "So far as consistent with the purposes and
provisions of this Act, grazing privileges recognized and
acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded, but the creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall not create any right,
title, interest, or estate in or to the lands."' 8
Section 8 of the Act provides that the Secretary of the
Interior may accept gifts of land within a district, or that
he may exchange federal lands for privately owned or state
owned lands, the Secretary's discretion in such exchanges
being restricted somewhat by the provisions of the section
as to notice to be given, value of lands, and location of lands.
Acceptance of gifts of land is authorized "where such action
will promote the purposes of the district or facilitate its
administration....,"
The Act also authorizes the Secretary, in his discretion,
to classify lands in the grazing district which are determined
to be more suitable for agricultural crop purposes than for
permittee's grazing unit is pledged as security for a bona fide loan, 'he
can hardly bring about the same result indirectly by terminating a permit
prior to the expiration of the term**.P" Id. at 431.
The Court stated:
[T~he provision . . . is one of the factors to be considered by the
Secretary in the establishing preferences between conflicting applications for permits on the federal range. By no means should it
be construed as providing that, by maintaining a lien on his
grazing unit, a permittee may also create and maintain a vested
interest therein which will prevent the United States from exchanging it under § 8 (b). Id. at 431.
This would seem to limit the availability of the provision fairly sharply
to the very narrow instance where there was a dispute between two livestock owners over the same lands, and then would simply seem to be
"one of the factors to be considered by the Secretary . . ." The Congressmen who enacted the Taylor Act would no doubt be surprised to hear to
what their extremely explicit language has been reduced.
17. 48 Stat. 1271 (1934).
18. 48 Stat. 1271 (1934).
19. 48 Stat. 1272 (1934).
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grazing purposes, and to open them to homestead entry in
tracts of land not greater than 320 acres. Such lands are not
so opened until after they are classified. If an individual
applies for entry on lands, and the Secretary makes a classification, the applicant shall have preference right to entry
when the lands are opened under the section.20 The language
of this Section was changed somewhat by a 1936 Amendment."1
The Secretary is now authorized, in his discretion, to examine
and classify lands which come under Executive Orders 6910
and 6964 or which are within a grazing district which are
more valuable for crops or more valuable for any other
purpose than for grazing and to open such lands for entry
under the applicable public-land laws.2 2
Sections 14 and 15 deal with "isolated or disconnected
tract(s) or parcel(s) of the public domain.""3 Section 14
authorizes the sale of such tracts, not exceeding 760 acres,
in the Secretary's discretion, upon notice as provided and
subject to certain preference rights to purchase in owners
of lands contiguous to the tract put up for sale. 2 ' Section 15
authorizes the leasing of such tracts "to owners of lands
contiguous thereto for grazing purposes, upon application
therefor by any such owner, and upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe." 2 5 Such lands are to
be in tracts of not less than 640 acres. In the administration
of the Taylor Act, such leased lands are referred to as" Section
15 lands."
One of the unique aspects of the administration stems
from Section 9, although the actual provision for it is an
amendment to the Act in 1939.26 Section 9 provided that
"The Secretary . . . shall provide, by suitable rules and
regulations, for cooperation with local associations of stock"Presumably acting under this authorization, local
men.... ,"
§ 7, 48 Stat. 1272 (1934).
Act of June 26, 1936, § 2, 49 Stat. 1976 (1936).
43 U.S.C. § 315f (1964).
48 Stat. 1274-75 (1934).
48 Stat. 1274 (1934).
48 Stat. 1275 (1934). The rules applicable to § 15 lands were amended
in 1968. They appear at 33 F.R. 11516 (1968). While § 15 lands are not
within the scope of this paper, the new rules are such that much of what
is said herein with reference to § 3 rights may now be also pertinent to
§ 15 lands.
26. Act of July 14, 1939, 53 Stat. 1002, as amended 43 U.S.C. 815-1(a) (1965).
27. 48 Stat. 1273 (1934).

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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advisory boards were established by the early regulations of
the Grazing Service. This practice was then codified by the
above amendment. As amended, the Act provides that there
shall be an advisory board of local stockmen in each district.
The board shall be made up of not less than five nor more
than 12 members, exclusive of wildlife representatives. Each
such board must have one wildlife representative appointed
by the Secretary in his discretion. Other members shall be
recommended for appointment by the Secretary by the users
of the district through election under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary. After the nominating
election, no such nominee shall take office until appointed
by the Secretary2 8 and taking oath of office. Members may
be removed, after due notice, by the Secretary if, in his
opinion, such removal would be for the good of the service.
Essentially these boards are to offer advice to the district
manager regarding the matters affecting the administration
of the districts. The district manager is charged with requesting the advice of the advisory board "in advance of
the promulgation of any rules and regulations affecting the
district." 9 Exception is provided to this where, in the judgment of the Secretary, an emergency exists. The board is
given the responsibility of offering advice and recommendations with respect of certain administrative actions of the
district, including offering advice and making recommendations on each application for a grazing permit within its
district. Where the application is that of one of the board's
members, such member is prohibited from participating in
the advice and recommendation.
The politics inherent within this system are discussed by
Calef and Foss in their studies. In most cases, the board
and the dstrict manager are in agreement."0 Where they are
not, however, the district manager's decision prevails, as the
board is merely advisory. It is said that in most instances
the district manager makes a real attempt to obtain the
28. Election is an automatic appointment. Interviews with BLM personnel,
Rawlins, Wyoming, Grazing District, July, 1967.
29. § 18(b) 53 Stat. 1003 (1939), 43 U.S.C. § 3150-1(b) (1964).
30. Interviews with BLM personnel, Rawlins and Lander, Wyoming, Grazing
Districts, July, 1967.
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advice and recommendations of the board and gives their
opinions weight in his decisions."
These are the provisions of the Taylor Act proper. Other
statutory materials which apply to and affect the administration of grazing districts and rights which a livestock
owner obtains to the use of district lands will be referred to
in the following sections, where appropriate.
Essentially, the Taylor Act seems to be a vehicle for
implementing the policy of Congress to regulate the use of
federal lands. It might be described as the earliest attempt
at a resource use concept by Congress. To implement this
regulation of the range, Congress provided for a system of
regulated grazing use of federal lands, such regulation to be
administered locally through grazing districts, with the advice
and recommendations of the local users. The regulated use
would be implemented by the granting of exclusive use permits to livestock grazers who met the qualifications provided
in the Act and the regulations of the Secretary. 2 The Act
provided that these did not give vested rights in the land, but
were privileges. But the question remains, what was meant
by privileges ?
III. Is THEnE A "RIGHT"?
The determination of whether there is a "grazing right"
lies in an analysis of the case law concerning the Act. The
BLM refers to the livestock operator's use as a privilege and
BLM personnel correct those who refer to the use as a "right".
The courts have used both terms and seem to have had no
difficulty determining, to their own satisfaction, that the
holder of a permit or license has something which the courts
will protect, whether it be referred to as a right or a privilege.
Early in the rather sketchy court history of the Taylor
Act, it was determined that the use represented by a permit
would be protected by a court. This seems to make the
privilege-right controversy between users and the BLM one
of semantics rather than substance. This is not to say that
31. Id.
32. The Secretary's regulations are set forth at 43 C.F.R. § 4110 (1968).
are also known as the Range Code.
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there are not real disputes as to the extent of the right. It
is to say, however, that what the user receives is a right which
will be protected by the courts within the confines of the Act
and other applicable rules. It is a dispute over the extent
of the right and not the existence of a right.
One of the earliest cases considering the Taylor Act is
Red Canyon Sheep Co .v. Ickes."3 In Red Canyon, the Court
enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from making a proposed exchange of certain grazing district lands for a tract
of land within the confines of a National Forest. The proposed exchange, when consummated, would have transferred
the federal lands within the grazing district, on which lands
the Red Canyon Company had a grazing license, to the owner
of the lands with the National Forest, in exchange for the
lands within the National Forest. Such an exchange would
have eliminated Red Canyon's use of the lands in the grazing
district.
The Secretary's primary defense against the complaint
of the user was that the permit holders "lacked any interest
to maintain the suit in that they had no vested interest in
the lands and did not show themselves entitled to a patent. "4
Although two alternative defenses were offered, this paper's
concern is with the primary defense, which, in its simplest
statement, was whether Red Canyon Sheep Company had a
grazing right in the lands in question.
The Court answered the question affirmatively in rather
plain language:
[I]f the Secretary determines to set up a grazing district including lands upon which grazing has
been going on, then those who have been grazing
their livestock upon these lands and who bring themselves within a preferred class set up by the statute
and regulations, are entitled as of right to permits
as against others who do not possess the same facilities for economic and beneficial use of the range."
This determination by the Court is the most general and favorable to a livestock permitee or licensee in the history of the
33. 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
34. Id. at 312.
35. Id. at 314. (emphasis added)
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Act. It is significant, perhaps, that the cases construing the
Act since Red Canyon have cited the case with approval and
then proceeded to limit the rule in it by a steady narrowing
of the extent of the right. Nevertheless, the case can be cited
for the proposition that the permitee or licensee has a right
which is cognizable and protected by the courts. The only
question is the extent of the right, and the other cases considering the Taylor Act have been concerned with this aspect.
They will be discussed infra.
Further indications that the use obtained is a right can
also be found. It seems to be of significance that the use
represented by the permit or license is a valuable asset."
However, the fact that the right is valuable has not prevented
courts from allowing appropriation of the right by the Federal
government. 7
In addition, it is rather common to consider the value of
such rights in sales of ranch properties and to capitalize
them into the sales price of a ranch property (as well as
indirectly into the tax burden of the owner of fee lands
supporting such rights). The Act itself seems to recognize
this in its restriction as to loans. 8 Further, there is provision
for almost automatic transferability of the right, both as an
appurtanancy to the base property and also as a separate
right in itself. 9 This transferability aspect of the right will
be discussed infra.
IV.

THE TOOLS

OF ADMINISTRATION

The basic device used to define the right which a user
obtains is the grazing permit (or license)."o The permit sets
out the quantitative use which a livestock owner obtains on
specific lands owned by the government. The use is measured
in animal unit months,4 1 such that a user obtains the use of
36. See, e.g., the statement in Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738 (10th Cir.
1949).
37. See cases discussed in part V.B.3 infra.
38. § 3, 48 Stat. 1270-71 (1934).
39. See discussion of this aspect of the right in part V.C. infra.
40. Technically, a permit seems to be a long-term use of more than one year
but less than ten years after an adjudication of the lands. A license is a
short-term year to year "permit" for the use of lands on which grazing
rights have not been adjudicated under 43 C.F.R. § 4111.3-2(b) (1968).
41. These are referred to as AUM's by the BLM. An AUM is the amount of
forage which a cow or horse will consume in one month or which five sheep
or five goats will consume in one month. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.0-5(m) (1968).
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a certain number of animal unit months of grazing on the
particular federal lands involved. There are various types
of permits and licenses, but the most important ones used are:
the adjudicated permit; the license; and the exchange of use
agreement. 2
Perhaps the best way to analyze these rights is to consider the processes of obtaining one. The procedure for the
first two types is similar and will be considered together.
The approach regarding changes of use is sufficiently different to warrant separate consideration.
In order to obtain a permit or license, the livestock owner
must personally meet the requirements set forth by the Act
and the Range Code regarding citizenship, livestock business,
and qualifications to do business in the state concerned."
Further, he must own or control base property which meets
the requirements of the Range Code, and offer such property
as the basis for his permit or license." All of this information
is supplied the District ELM Office on application forms
supplied by the office. Such applications must be received
each year before a date set by the District Manager for the
filing of such applications. Those filed on the date or subsequent thereto "may be rejected for that year unless satisfactory justification for the belated filing is shown.""
All of the applications are first presented to the district
advisory board for its advice and recommendation." The advisory board makes its recommendation regarding the granting of the permit, and if such advice is adverse to the applicant, the board is required to set forth its reasons for the
adverse recommendation. The District Manager is then free
to accept the board's recommendation or reject it. If the
decision of either the Board or Manager, or both, is adverse
to the applicant, the manager must serve notice on the applicant giving the reasons for such decision and giving the
42. This is an agreement between the BLM and a private landowner for
administration of the landowner's lands by the BLM in exchange for free
use of BLM grazing lands. Although it is not technically a permit, it is
a commonly used tool for granting a grazing right to a user.
43. See 43 C.F.R. § 4111.1-1 (1968). See also § 2 of the Taylor Act.
44. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(e) (1968).
45. 43 C.F.R. 4115.2-1 (a) (1) (1968).
46. This is subject to the proviso that if the applicant is also a board member,
he cannot participate in the consideration of his application. 43 C.F.R.
§ 4115.2-1(a) (2) (1968).
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applicant an opportunity to protest the decision. If the protest is approved, and the manager agrees, then this is the
end of the matter and the applicant gets his permit. If the
protest is disapproved, then the applicant is given the opportunity to appeal the decision through the appeals system of
the BLM.47
As a usual thing, all of these applications are presented
to the Board at one meeting. One writer describes one such
meeting and seems to express disappointment in what he
observed. 8 His disappointment seems to be similar to that
of the average person who attends his city council meeting.
The reasons are perhaps the same. Most of the board members
have spoken to one another and to the District Manager
before the meeting is held, and most decisions have been made
before the meeting. The meeting is merely a formality where
the formal decisions are made and recorded. In this give and
take, the manager with political acumen is often successful;
acumen is lacking often has difthe manager whose political
49
ficulties with his board.
Originally, the principal reason for the advisory board
seems to have been to serve as a fact finding board regarding
the prior use requirements of the Act. It still does this, but
this function has been overshadowed by the further, perhaps
more important, function of being a sounding board for the
District Manager in his administration of the district. Administratively, it is more desirable for the District Manager to
have the board on "his side", than to have it against him.
This is because the boards are usually made up of the more
influential livestock operators who have political connections
which can be troublesome to the manager. If the board agrees
with him, he is less likely to have trouble in administering his
district. Further, as a result of the large number of applications, the rather vague rules regarding qualification, and
47. 43 C.F.R. § 4113.2-3 (1968).
48. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS 109-116.
49. Author's conclusions based on interviews with BLM personnel of Rawlins
and Lander, Wyoming, Grazing Districts and on CALEF, PRIVATE GRAZING
AND PUBLIC LANDS (1960) and Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS (1960). It should
be noted that the author's conclusions differ rather considerably from
those of Foss. Foss' study, however, was more oriented toward the political
side of Taylor administration and could very well be more valid. The
author's conclusions are based on a less extensive study than Foss' or
Calef's.
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the expertise of the local personnel of the BLM, the Board
has become more of a sounding board for policy, rather than
a fact finding board."
Once a livestock owner has his permit, he then has the
right to use the number of animal units specified in the
permit, on the lands specified in the permit, during the season
of use specified in the permit. The permit is subject to
various limitations, and can be withdrawn, reduced or cancelled for various reasons, which will be discussed infra.
Use under the permit, of course, assumes that the livestock operator has paid the fee for such a permit. The fee
is calculated in terms of animal unit months and is announced each year in the Federal Register.5 1
Essentially, the permit is simply a tool used in the administration of the act to set forth the quantitative right which
the BLM has determined to grant the user. It represents the
right to such use, much in the same way in which a water
permit represents an individual's right to use water. The
more difficult question is exactly what, precisely, is represented by this permit, that is to say, under what conditions
can it be withdrawn, what are the responsibilities attached
thereto, what are the conditions made a part thereof, and
similar questions.
The exchange of use agreement is somewhat different in
nature. The Range Code provides:
Exchange-of-use agreements may be issued to
any applicant having ownership or control of nonFederal land interspersed and normally grazed in
conjunction with the surrounding Federal range for
not to exceed the grazing capacity of such nonFederal land, without payment of grazing fees, provided that during the term of the agreement the
Bureau shall have the management and control of
such non-Federal land for grazing purposes."2
The exchange of use provision seems to be the result of the
checkerboarding of lands often found in public land states.
50. Id.
51. The author has been unable to find the specific formula on which such
fees are calculated.
52. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(h) (1968).
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In such a situation, the landowner agrees to put his land
under BLM administration in exchange for the use of federal
lands in his livestock operation. However, the user is limited
to using such lands (including his own) only during the grazing season set by the District in which such lands lie. He
receives, however, the use of the number of animal unit
months represented by his private lands without charge."
The practical necessity for such a provision can be seen in
the checkerboard situation where private lands and public
lands are interspersed roughly as every other section. The
private owner can not fence his own lands without fencing
the Federal lands. He cannot graze his own lands without
trespassing the federal governments' lands. If the federal
government puts other users in the area, they will trespass
the private owner's lands, and the private owner has no recourse against the federal government. 4 So the solution is
to allow the private land owner to put his lands under BLM
administration, and allow the Bureau to administer such
lands in exchange for the use of a number of animal units
equal to the forage value of the private lands. The provision
seems to have settled the problem, to a degree."
The procedure for obtaining such an agreement is somewhat different from that of obtaining a permit or license.
So far as can be determined from the regulations, the procedure seems to be an ad hoc one whereby the private owner
or the district manager suggests to the other the possibility
of such an arrangement, and they proceed to negotiate such
an agreement, somewhat as any other contract, except that
certain provisions are not subject to negotiation. The theory
breaks down somewhat, however, when one turns to practice.
The District Manager only uses the agreement form furnished
by the Department of Interior. The form is the end of
negotiations. The owner has his choice of exchange of use,
the granting of which is in the discretion of the District
Manager," or of fencing his lands in such a way that Bureau
53. The calculation of the number of AUM's represented by the private lands,
is, of course, the BLM's.
54. United States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1964).
55. But see Morrell & Sons, 72 I.D. 100 (1965), in which the livestock operator
did not agree that the problem was solved and in the process of dispute,
lost other of his grazing rights.
56. Id.
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lands are still accessible, or of not using his lands. Since the
making of such an agreement is in the discretion of the
District Manager, the appeals route is a difficult one when
such an agreement has been refused.

V.

THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT

The right which an operator receives is subject to a
great many limitations, ranging from those on the quantity
of the right to those on the actual maintenance of the right
itself. These limitations are to be found in the Act, the Range
Code, the Interior Decisions,"' and the court cases interpreting the Act and the regulations thereunder. This paper shall
first consider those of an administrative nature, which usually
go to the extent of the right, or the quantity of the right,
and secondly, those which can destroy the right.
A. Adminisrative Limitations on Obtaining and Keeping a
Right. (Range Code)
The first limitations which a prospective applicant faces
are those criteria for obtaining a right. These are limitations
in the sense that the applicant must meet these criteria in
order to obtain the right, and if at some future date, he no'
longer comes within them, he loses the right.
The first requirement which the applicant must meet is
is that he comes within the citizenship standards of the Act"
and of the Range Code. 9 These are specific and there are
very few questions which arise with regard to them. Other
criteria, however, raise questions of fact determination and
interpretation.
The second requirement which the applicant must meet
is that he must have base property on which to base such a
right. Base property is the subject of a great many regulations and decisions of the Interior Department. In the
grazing situation, they come down to, simply, the ownership
or control of water or land, depending on the nature of the
57. All of the Interior decisions prior to 1958 dealing with the Taylor Act
have been gathered in the volume entitled Grazing Decisions, published
by the United States Government.
58. § 3, 48 Stat. 1270 (1934).
59. 43 C.F.R. § 4111.1-1 (1968).
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district." This base property must be sufficient to support
the applicant's livestock operation during that part of the
year when the public range is not available.6 The BLM
determines the number of livestock which an operator's base
property can support." Loss of base property, of course, will
result in loss of grazing rights, to the extent of the loss of
base property, unless such rights can be transferred to other
base property.
Another requirement is that the base property also had
to support livestock on the public range prior to the passage
of the Taylor Act during certain priority periods. If the
number of livestock which were grazed on the public range
was less than the amount which could be supported by the
base property, this lesser number was used, for the reason
that use of the range was one measuring tool. This amount,
however, was rarely less than the commensurability amount,
principally for the reason that no one was really sure just
how many livestock he had been running on the range during
the priority periods. As a result of changes over the years,
this determination has become somewhat less important although it was still viable enough to protect one operator when

the district in which he was grazing. attempted to put into
effect a special rule changing the priority period. As to him,
it was ruled that the special rule did not apply, since he had

met the priority, and it would not be equitable to change the
period as to him.6"
60. Provision is made in the Range Code for land base districts, water base
districts and combined districts. In land base districts, land is the measuring unit on which the right is based; in water base districts, water is the
measuring unit. In those Districts which by special rule have been
designated land and water base districts, both are the measuring unit
according to the formula adopted as part of the special rule.
61. This is usually referred to in terms of days, e.g. the Rawlins and Lander,
Wyoming Grazing Districts are both 100-day districts, which means that
the base property of the applicant must support for 100 days the livestock
of the applicant which are placed on the public domain.
62. This determination is based on information received from the livestock
operator in his application and is subjected to various factors and formulas
contained in the BLM Manual. The BLM Manual is the paper management
and information system of the Bureau in all its aspects. It supplements
all of the Regulations of the BLM. It is a ten volume work, constantly
changing. A full, up-to-date, copy is available in any BLM District or
State Office.
63. McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The victory was not all
that great for Mr. McNeil, since he had a greater quantitative right under
the proposed priority period than he did under the original period. McNeil
v. Udall, 340 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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The next determination which must be considered is the
carrying capacity of the range. No matter how many livestock
the operator may be able to support and no matter how many
he may have formerly grazed on the public range, if that
number is greater than the carrying capacity of the range,
as determined by the BLM, then the carrying capacity is the
measuring fact. This amount is determined by the use of
various estimating techniques ranging from the fairly primitive to the reasonably scientific. 4
Thus, the applicant must meet and maintain several criteria for his right: he must have base property, the base property must support the Animal Units for which he receives a
permit, the base property must have been the basis for use
of the range prior to the Taylor Act (unless the right has
been transferred from such property to the present base
property), and the carrying capacity of the range in the
particular allotment, unit, or district must be sufficient to
carry the applicant's proposed livestock. If he meets the
above criteria, the applicant may receive a permit (i.e. have
an adjudication of grazing use, which is represented by the
permit). If he receives a permit, it will be subject to a great
many more limitations.
The Range Code 5 sets forth fourteen conditions to which
every permit or license is subject. Many of these go to day
to day administrative housekeeping and range management
conditions and will not be discussed here. All permitees and
licensees are also subject to the Rules of the Range" which
again are general rules for adequate administration of the
range. However, it should be cautioned that violation of these
conditions might be sufficient (and are always bases) for
reduction or cancellation of the permit." In fact, any violation of the Act, or of the regulations or of the conditions of
the permit is sufficient for reduction or cancellation of the
permit. 8
64. These various techniques are set out in the BLM Manual in the section
corresponding to the Range Code (C.F.R.) section 4110.0-5. The reasonableness of their accuracy is dependent upon the technique's susceptibility
to statistical proof.
65. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(e) (1968).
66. 43 C.F.R. § 4112.3 (1968).
67. 43 C.F.R. § 4113.1 (1968).
68. 43 C.F.R. § 4113.1 (1968).
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Section 4111.4-2 of the Range Code" authorizes the District Manager in a district to increase permits where the
Section
grazing (carrying) capacity has been increased."
Manager
District
the
authorizes
4111.4-3 of the Range Code"
to reduce permit numbers.
It can be seen that the Range Code provides for a permit
subject to the decisions of a local administrator regarding
fact determinations and their interpretations. It might be
added that these determinations are in the discretion of the
local District Manager. While such decision may be appealed
through the administrative structure of the Department and
while the decision of a District Manager might be modified
at a higher level, such would seem to be the exception rather
than the ruleJ 2
The case law has affected the extent of this aspect of the
right somewhat, although the nature of the cases makes it
difficult to trace the limits precisely. Many of the cases
which have come before the various courts have been involved
with the Federal Tort Claims Act, rather than with actual
judicial review of the decision of the Interior Department in
the administrative law sense. Here, this paper will consider
those cases which affect the administrative actions of those
acting under the Taylor Act, whether such cases be judicial
review of administrative action or independent tort claim
actions.
The earliest case considering issues under the Taylor
Act within the scope of this article is the case of Red Canyon
Sheep Co. v. Ickes." The case involved several questions, one
of which is discussed infra. The question with which this
article is here concerned is whether the local manager can
69. 43 C.F.R. § 4111.4-2 (1968).
70. The author found one example of the exercise of this authority in one
allotment of the Shell Creek Unit of the Rawlins, Wyoming, Grazing District. In the two Districts in Wyoming which the author considered, this
was the only example of such exercise at that time.
71. 43 C.F.R. § 4111.4-3 (1968). The exercise of this authority seems more
common than the exercise of the authority to increase. This is probably
due to the accuracy of the assertion that most students of the Grazing
Districts, across the Western States have made, to wit: That the original
determinations made of carrying capacity during the late 1930's were greatly overestimated.
72. Particularly with respect to a determination by the District Manager as
to actual quantity of use as opposed to a determination to cancel or withdraw a permit.
73. 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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refuse to give a person a right, where such person qualifies
under the Act and the Range Code. The language of the case
is such that it would appear that the manager must grant
the application if the applicant meets the requirements. The
Court stated that where such is the case, the appellant is entitled "as of right to permits as against others who do not
possess the same facilities for economic and beneficial use
of the range."" The case emphasizes that one of the purposes
of the Act is to define the right which a livestock operator
obtains in order that he can depend on it and plan on it.
There is some question, however, as to whether this is still
the law (even in the District of Columbia Circuit). Later
cases involving the Taylor Act as its administration comes
within the Tort Claims Act have come to a somewhat different
conclusion.
In the case of Oman v. United States,7 5 the Court had
before it an appeal from a decision in the District Court
which sustained the United States' motion to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of
action and that it was not a claim within the jurisdiction
of the Court. The decision of the Tenth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case for trial.
The facts of the case as alleged in plaintiff's complaint
were that the plaintiffs had a grazing permit upon certain
lands and that theirs was an exclusive right to graze the lands
in question. The plaintiff's predecessors in interest in the
fee lands which were the basis for plaintiff's grazing rights
had grazing permits on the same federal lands, such permits
being based on the property which had been transferred to
the plaintiffs. This resulted from the failure of the ELM to
cancel the predecessor's permits. On the basis of these
alleged facts the plaintiffs urged that the employees of the
United States encouraged the use of the lands to the detriment of the plaintiffs' exclusive grazing right, thus damaging
plaintiffs.
The case leaves open the question of whether the granting
of new permits to the transferees (i.e. the plaintiffs) is in
74. Id. at 314.
75. 179 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949).
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the discretion of the District Manager but does find that
there is no discretion as to cancelling them as to the predecessors in interest due to their loss of ownership of the
base property. As to the further question of whether this
is the type of right which a Court will protect, the Court
used some very broad language. It stated:
In the case at bar.. . there was no attempt to revoke,
but instead an outright interference with the plaintiffs' grazing rights while their permits remained
outstanding and unrevoked. As long as the permits
were unrevoked, the grantor would have no more
right to interfere with their exercise than would any
third party. In fact, by the very terms of the Taylor
Act, the grantor (defendant) had not merely a duty
to refrain from the invasion of plaintiffs' grazing
privileges, but an affirmative obligation to adequately safeguard them."8
In other words, the Court would seem to be saying that while
the question of whether the District Manager has to grant a
right is still open, when he does so grant a right (permit or
license), even the grantor can not interfere with the exercise
of that right wrongfully so long as the permit or license is
outstanding. On remand, however, the plaintiffs again lost
since the District Court held that they did not in fact have
an exclusive right on the lands in question and the Court
of Appeals affirmed.7
The next case which bears on the questions considered in
8 another
this article was that of Chournos v. United States,"
Torts Claim Act case. In this case, the plaintiff, a large sheep
operator, had obtained a large number of checkerboard acres
from Southern Pacific. Prior to his purchasing these lands,
the grazing district had administered them as a part of
the district through an agreement with Southern Pacific,
whereby the rentals paid went to Southern Pacific. After
acquiring the lands, plaintiff was informed that he had
created a problem which could only be solved by his entering
into an exchange of use agreement with the district or by
his leasing the land to the district. The exchange of use
76. Id. at 742 (Court's footnotes omitted).
77. Oman v. United States, 195 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1952).
78. 193 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1951).
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arrangement was agreed upon, and exchange of use and crossing permits were issued to plaintiff.
Plaintiff failed to renew his exchange of use agreement,
and as a result was denied trailing privileges across the
federal lands which it was necessary he cross in order to
use his own lands. Plaintiff filed an application for an
exclusive grazing permit on the federal lands contiguous with
his lands. This was denied, and he lost on appeal to the
Department. The parties attempted to work out some sort
of arrangement, but were precluded on the one hand by
plaintiff's desire to control his own lands, and on the other
hand, by the BLM's refusal to grant trailing permits or to
grant him an exclusive right to graze the federal lands contiguous to his. Here, things stood, when plaintiff brought his
sheep into the area and grazed them on federal land (as well
as on his own). The BLM brought trespass charges against
plaintiff. Conferences followed, plaintiff agreed to enter into
an exchange of use agreement, the trespass charges were
settled, and the same permits as before were granted.
Plaintiff then brought this action, urging "that under the
provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act he is, as a matter of law,
entitled to grazing permits upon adjacent and contiguous
lands and to crossing permits to move his sheep from one
range to another; that the representative of the United States,
for the purpose of coercing plaintiff into surrendering control of his lands to the district refused to issue such permits;
and that such refusal and coercion were unlawful and together
constituted a tort within the meaning of the Federal Tort
Claims Act." 9 The Court very simply states:
The purpose of the Taylor Grazing Act is to
stabilize the livestock industry and to permit the use
of the public range according to the needs and the
qualifications of the livestock operators with base
holdings. To carry out this purpose, the Act and the
Range Code authorized by the Act contemplate that
the officials, with the advice of an advisory board
composed of permit holders within the district, shall
exercise their judgment and discretion in granting
permits, and in determining the extent to which lands
within the district shall be grazed. A livestock owner
79. Id. at 323.
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does not have the right to take matters into his own
hands and graze public lands without a permit. If
there is dissatisfaction with the action of the officials
in the granting of permits, or as to other decisions,
the livestock owner's remedy is by appeal as provided
for in the Act and the Code .... It seems clear to us
that the granting or rejection of the applications
here was within the discretionary function of the
range officials as contemplated by Sec. 2680 (a) of
the Federal Tort Claims Act...."
This language would seem to make the granting of a permit
discretionary on the part of the District Manager, subject
to the review provided for by the Department of the Interior.
And yet the language as to this would seem to be mere
dictum, since the court's actual holding is that the act of
the official is discretionary for purposes of the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The actual question of whether the act is discretionary in terms of the Taylor Act has not really been
considered. Notwithstanding this, the case would seem to
at least support an argument that the granting or denial of
permits by the District Manager is in his discretion. If it does
support such an argument the only redress is in those cases
where it is determined that he has exceeded his discretion
and acted arbitrarily and capriciously, which is rather difficult to prove under extremely good circumstances.
The next case of significance was in the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In McNeil v. Seaton,8
the Court was presented with a question of whether a special
rule adopted by a grazing district could be applied to one who
had received his right under the original priority period.
McNeil had received a permit under the priority period provided for in the Act and the Regulations thereunder in 1936.
In 1956, a special rule was promulgated for the district changing the priority period from the five years preceding June of
1934 to a period consisting of the five year period preceding
January of 1953. The Court held, that, as to McNeil, the rule
could not be applied in derogation of any right which he had
obtained under the first priority period. The language of
80. Id. at 323-24 (Court's footnotes omitted).
81. 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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this Court perhaps best summarizes the status of a Taylor
right as it now stands:
It is clear that permittee as against the United
States may acquire no "right, title, interest, or estate
in or to the lands" (emphasis added) as Section 3
provides, and the Government for its own use may
without payment of compensation withdraw the permit privilege. Otherwise, consistently with the purposes and provisions of the Act, "grazing privileges
recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately
safeguarded." It would seem beyond preadventure
that when the Secretary in 1935 created Montana
Grazing District No. 1 which included lands upon
which this appellant then was grazing, he and others
similarly situated "who have been grazing their
livestock upon these lands and who bring themselves
within a preferred class set up by the statute and
regulations, are entitled as of right to permits as
against others who do not possess the same facilities
for economic and beneficial use of the range."
What particular number of stock a preference
applicant might be entitled to graze must depend
upon circumstances, having in mind the orderly use
of the public lands, the possibility of overgrazing,
the forage capacity of the base property, available
water and other factors pertinent to such a complicated administrative problem. Subject to such considerations and others specified in the Code, the
extent of the appellant's grazing privileges was to
be determined.
"Preference shall be given" to those like appellant
who come within the Act. This appellant not only
was engaged in stockraising when the Act was passed,
but he qualified under the Range Code as and when
first promulgated. He was entitled to rely upon
the preference Congress had given him: to use the
public range as dedicated to a special purpose in aid
of Congressional policy. We deem his rights-whatever their exact nature-to have been "protected
against tortious invasion " and to have been "founded
on a statute which confers a privilege." Accordingly
this appellant was entitled to invest his time, effort
and capital and to develop his stockraising business,
all subject, of course, to similar preferences to be
accorded in the affected area to others comparably
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situated. We see no basis upon which, by a special
rule adopted more than twenty years after appellant
had embarked upon his venture, he may lawfully
be deprived of his statutory privilege. 2
This, too, was an empty victory, since it was later determined
that McNeil had more rights under the new priority period
than under the original one."3
Thus, on the cases, it would seem that the right which
an applicant might receive is subject to the administrative
determinations of the BLM, but that those decisions are
subject to review to determine whether the BLM has neglected
to protect the right granted against invasions by third parties
or by the Federal government, where the permit is still outstanding. Nevertheless, the permit is subject to withdrawal
by the Federal government, without compensation, where
necessary for governmental purposes. This is the next subject
to which we shall turn, the ultimate limitations on the right,
that is, those areas where the permit holder can lose his right,
notwithstanding that he has a permit outstanding. We shall
also consider the common provisions for loss of right in the
Range Code, other than for violations of the Code, discussed
supra.
B. Some Ultimate Limitations on the Right.
The ultimate limitations on the right fall into three
different categories: non-use of the right; failure to offer
base property; and changes in use by the Federal government.
We shall examine these in turn.
1. Non-use. Non-use refers in one sense to the permit
which a permit holder can obtain when he wishes to use less
than the number of AUM's to which he is entitled but wishes
to protect the right from cancellation. It may be obtained by
application to the District Manager for the following reasons:
conservation and protection of the Federal range, annual
fluctuations in livestock operations, or financial or other
reasons beyond the control of the licensee or permittee8 4
Obtaining this type of permit will protect the permit from
82. Id. at 934-35, 937 (Court's footnotes omitted).
83. McNeil v. Udall, 340 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
84. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1 (e) (11) (1968).
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cancellation, although it is still subject to that section of the
Range Code"5 which provides that failure to make use of the
right for any two consecutive years can result in revocation.
The section seems to place the exercise of this revocation in
the discretion of the District Manager. 6 Non-use for two
years consecutively without any sort of application for same
from the BLM can be the basis for a reduction or cancellation
of the right.8 7
2. Failure to offer base property. The failure to offer
base property in an application for a license or pernit or
renewal thereof for two consecutive years can result in the
loss of the base property qualifications which serve as the
basis for the right.88 Once such qualifications are lost, they
are lost forever, unless another right can be transferred to
them.
3. Changes in use by the Federal Government. On the
basis of the case law, this seems to be the most significant
area in which a permittee can lose his permit. Here, we use
the term changes in use to indicate any determination, however made, that the land will no longer be used for grazing.
Several cases have dealt with this problem.
The earliest case to deal with this problem was the Red
Canyon Sheep Co. case" discussed supra. There, it was
determined that the Secretary had not made the proper
determination and that he was therefore enjoined from
exchanging the land with another party to the detriment of
the plaintiff user. However, the Court refused to make the
injunction permanent on the grounds that there were possible
ways in which the Secretary might make a proper determination and therefore exchange the lands, and that until
those facts were before the Court, it would not permanently
enjoin the Secretary, but would only enjoin him from acting
as to the facts presented.
85. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(e) (10) (1968).
86. It was mentioned in the interviews at the Rawlins and Lander, Wyoming,
Grazing Districts that the BLM considers non-use permits to be tools for
short-run changes, and that the consistent use of a non-use permit may
be used as evidence that the number of AUM's granted by the regular
permit is too great.
87. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(e) (9) (i) (1968).
88. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-1(e) (9) (i) (1968).
89. 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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The next case involving Taylor lands was a condemnation case. This was the case of United States v. Cox." In
this case, the United States was condemning lands in New
Mexico, which included the appellants' ranches and the lands
which their permits covered. These lands were to be used
for war purposes by the United States. In the lower Court,
witnesses were allowed to base their evaluation of the value
of the ranches on the carrying capacity of the ranch times
the unit value of the calf crop, plus the value of the improvements. The jury was finally instructed to the effect that
the government was taking only the fee land and that it
should determine only the value of such land, but in doing
so, it could take into consideration as an element of value,
the accessability and availability of the lands covered by the
grazing permits. The government did not object to this
instruction at the trial level, and indeed, offered one substantially the same. But the Court determined that this was
not an acceptable measurement of the value of the lands confiscated for the reason that the permit rights which the
individuals owned were privileges subject to withdrawal at
any time without compensation, and that by calculating in
this fashion, the individual owners were being compensated
for their grazing rights. In distinguishing this case from the
companion case decided the same day United States v.
Jaramillo,1 the Court determined that in Cox, the permits
were no longer outstanding at the time of the condemnation,
since they had been condemned along with the fee lands.
Therefore, they had been withdrawn, and the determination
of the value of the ranches in Cox should be determined without the added value of the appurtenant rights. In Jaramillo,
on the other hand, which involved Forest permits, the right
had not been condemned, was still outstanding and therefore
the value of Jaramillo's ranch could be determined with the
availability of the right included as part of that value.
Thus, it worked out as follows. Those individuals who had
their entire ranch and Taylor grazing rights condemned (i.e.
who lost their rights) could obtain compensation only to the
extent of the worth of their fee lands without the Taylor
90. 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1951).
91. 190 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951).
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grazing rights attached. Those individuals who only lost part
of their ranch and retained their forest permit rights, (and
therefore lost no rights) could have the value of that part
of the ranch which they lost calculated with the right considered as a part thereof. The person who lost his right
got no credit for the right; the person who lost no right was
compensated for a right he did not lose. It is difficult to
determine how a court could come to so basically an inequitable result, denying compensation to those who lost something,
but giving compensation to those who do not lose anything.
This is particularly true where the Court making the determination presumably has some familiarity with the area of
the country in which it is sitting and should be able to understand the nature of the right which is involved. Where the
Court wishes to make a decision which will cost the United
States the least amount of money, however, it seems able to
do so with no difficulty, notwithstanding the school of thought
which urges that the sovereign should pay for that which it
takes (even if it is only an expectation in a privilege conferred by the sovereign.) Further, it is difficult for this
author to see (as it was for Judge Phillips, who dissented in
the Cox decision) the difference between the Jaramillo and
Cox cases, The Court could distinguish them; this author
can not.
The next case involving this type of permit loss was that
of LaRue v. Udall.92 In this case, the federal government
determined to exchange a large block of land in Nevada
Grazing District No. 3 for that owned by a private owner in
Nevada Grazing District No. 2. Appellants had permits on
the lands in Grazing District No. 3, and the exchange would
destroy their entire operation. The Court sympathized with
the appellants, but found against them pointing out that the
Secretary had the power under Section 8 of the Act to
exchange lands when to do so would be in the public interest.
The appellants contended that public interest as used therein
meant public interest in grazing and conservation which will
be benefitted thereby. They urged that the exchange with
North American Aviation for purposes of giving them a missile testing range was not the public interest which Section 8
92. 324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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covers. The Court said that if this is what Congress meant,
that this is what Congress should have said. Since it did not
and since there is nothing elsewhere in the Act which would
preclude such an exchange, "nothing in the other sections
of the act suggest that private interests may not acquire public
land being used for grazing purposes to the detriment of those
licensed to use the land."9 3 The Court also found the powers
of the Secretary under Section 7 of the Act persuasive here
as to the intent of Congress.
Chief Judge Bazelon filed a concurring opinion, in which
he determined that the Court had approved the Secretary's
determination that the Taylor Act was a multiple purpose
statute. On this basis he was forced to concur since he did
not find that the Taylor Act was a multi-purpose act. From
the legislative history of the Act, he determined that the
Taylor Act was limited to the regulation of grazing on public
lands and to conservation purposes, and that to make an
exchange under Section 8 of the Act, it would be necessary
to find that the public interest in grazing or conservation
would be benefitted by the exchange. As the Secretary had
found that grazing would be benefitted by the exchange, in
that the consolidation of land would enable more efficient
administration, he concurred in the result of the Court's
decision.
It is interesting to note that neither the Court's opinion
nor the concurring opinion felt it necessary to consider the
Red Canyon case, which would appear to be at least partly
in point. However, the determination by the Court would
seem to be consistent with the Red Canyon case, since in
LaRue, the Court decided that the action of the Secretary was
valid, and in Red Canyon, it was determined that the action
was invalid. In Red Canyon, an exchange was enjoined on
the grounds that the lands had been withdrawn by an Executive Order of 1934 withdrawing all lands within Taylor Grazing District, and that any land which could be exchanged
under the Act on which the proposed transferee and the
Secretary were depending had to be unreserved and unappropriated. The Executive Order had reserved and appropriated
93. Id. at 431.
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the lands in question. Section 8 of the Taylor Act was not
mentioned in the opinion, although the Court left open the
question as to whether the Secretary could reclassify the lands
in question under Section 7 of the Act and then exchange
them (i.e. by reclassifying them, they would no longer be
reserved and appropriated and thus no longer protected by
the Executive Order.)
C. Transferability of the Right.
Probably one of the primary indications that what the
permittee receives is a right is the fact that provision is made
for transferring the right, either as an appurtenance to the
base property or to entirely new base property. However,
this transferability aspect does have some limitations.
The Range Code provides that in the instance where
base property is transferred, the right follows it, unless the
grantor of the base saves the right by transferring it to other
property of his which qualifies as base property. 4 It is,
however, necessary for the transferee to file documentary
evidence of the transfer and an application for grazing permit
with the District Manager of the District within 90 days of
the transfer in order to qualify for this. 5 Further, the District Manager can deny the application if he finds that the
transfer, or a different vesting in any manner, of a leasehold
interest in land or water "may result in interference with
the stability of livestock operations or with proper range
management .... '" It is necessary that he refers this determination to the advisory board for their advice and thereafter,
if he still thinks it will be detrimental as per the above, he
may then deny the permit. However, as to transfers in fee,
the transfer of the right would seem to be automatic under
§ 4115.2-2 (a) (1) which provides:
A transfer of a base property or part thereof ... will entitle the transferee, if qualified under
§ 4111.1-1, to so much of the grazing privileges as are
based thereon."
94.
95.
96.
97.

43
43
43
43

C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.
C.F.R.

§
§
§
§

4115.2-2 (1968).
4115.2-2(a) (2) (1968).
4115.2-2(a) (2) (1968).
4115.2-2(a) (1) (1968).
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The section also provides that, except under certain conditions, the permit previously existing shall automatically
terminate. The transferee must still give notice, however.
The second type of transfer of the right is where the
permit transfers base property qualifications to new base
property (i.e. changing the underlying basis for the right.)."
In order to effect such a transfer, the owner or controller of
the base property applies for such a transfer of qualifications
by filing application with the District Manager. If the
District Manager approves, then the transfer is made. If
the land is encumbered or if the controller of the base
property is not the owner, the approval of these other persons
will also be necessary for the transfer.
It should be noted that in either case, the District Manager can deny the application for transfer (although the
transfer following the transfer of fee base property would
seem to be automatic) if he finds that the transfer would
interfere with the stability of the livestock operations or with
proper range management. The question of whether a transferee is entitled to a permit has never been answered by a
court, although it was aluded to in Oman v. United States, 9
and the question seems to be still open.
It is rather common. to have one individual transfer
base property requirements to the base property of another
individual, which would seem to be a sale of the grazing
right itself. This would seem a pretty odd incident of the
type of privilege which the BLM insists the permit is.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

It would appear that while there is a grazing right under
Section 3 of the Taylor Act, it is rather a precarious right,
both as to the numerical quantity of the right and as to the
retention of the right itself. It seems fairly clear that while
the permit is outstanding, the permittee is entitled to protection from interference with his use. However, the difficulties of withdrawing the permit are not too great. While
98. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-2(b) (1968).
99. 179 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949).
100. Interviews with personnel of Rawlins and Lander, Wyoming, Grazing
Districts.
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the Act did much to stabilize the livestock industry as compared to the time prior to the Act, there is still a great deal
of unpredictability involved in the right.
Further, the broad language of the Court in the LaRue
case would seem to bode ill for the rancher. If the Taylor
Act is a multi-purpose act, then the public interest to which
it refers is not the public interest of grazing and conservation,
but perhaps the total public interest of the Multiple Use Act.
If this is so, then exchanges such as made in Red Canyon
(enjoined) and in LaRue (approved) can be made on any
basis whereby the Secretary of the Interior determines that
some public benefit may be served thereby, with a minimum
of review by the Courts, and, it would appear in light of
Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion in LaRue, in derogation
of the expressed intent of Congress to limit the Secretary's
power to alienate lands. Further, he can make this decision
without any real reclassification as presumed by Section 7
of the aylor Act, but with the mere determination that the
exchange would further some interest of the public, whatever
it might be. While it would appear that Congress has not
given the Secretary this authority under the Taylor Act, the
majority opinion in LaRue indicates differently, at least in
the District of Columbia Circuit.
It would appear the Land Law Review Commission
should attempt to better define the right which a user obtains
and the processes by which the user can lose such a right.
Notwithstanding that the right is a privilege as to the Federal
government, it would seem that the language of the Court in
McNeil v. Seaton 1 ' regarding the right of the user to invest
his time and effort would be apropos here. Indeed, Congress
has recognized this in establishing a compensatory scheme for
such rights when such are taken for defense purposes.'
If
it is a compensable right for defense takings, it would seem
that it should be a compensable right for all takings where
the user has invested his time and effort in expectation of the
continuation of the right. Since many livestock enterprises
are worthless without the grazing right, the destruction of
grazing rights often completely eliminates the operation, with
101. 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
102. 43 U.S.C. § 315g (1964).
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little or no compensation being given to the operator. Presumably, if the Federal government needs the lands, it should
pay for the right which it has thereby destroyed. If the Courts
are unable to see their way clear to such an equitable and
just result in cases involving the destruction of the right
under the law as it exists, Congress should clarify its already
fairly clear language and make this point so crystal clear
that the Courts can not misinterpret the meaning.
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